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Psychologists study regret primarily by measuring subjects’ atti-
tudes in laboratory experiments. This does not shed light on how
expected regret aﬀects economic actions in market settings. To ad-
dress this, we use proprietary data from a blackjack table in Las Ve-
gas to analyze how expected regret aﬀects peoples’ decisions during
gambles. Even among a group of people who choose to participate
in a risk-taking activity, we ﬁnd strong evidence of an economically
signiﬁcant omission bias: players incur substantial losses by playing
too conservatively. This behavior is prevalent even among large stakes
gamblers, and becomes more severe following previous aggressive play,
suggesting a rebound eﬀect after aggressive play.
1 Introduction
Much of modern economics is built on the premise that people maximize their
expected utility for wealth when making decisions under uncertainty. In con-
trast, psychologists argue that people often act not so much to maximize their
expected utility, but instead to minimize their expected regret—that is, peo-
ple make choices to minimize their expected feeling of remorse when an action
∗We thank Dan Ariely, Shlomo Benartzi, Mark Grinblatt, Rick Larrick, Cade Massey,
Jeﬀ Pontiﬀ, Ed Rice, Andrei Shleifer, Richard Thaler, and seminar participants at the
University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. Any errors are our own.
1turns out badly compared to other alternatives (Loomes and Sugden, 1982,
1983; Bell, 1982; Larrick and Boles, 1995). In some decision environments,
this can lead people to favor inaction over action, inducing what is known as
the omission/commission bias (Gilovich and Medvec, 2001; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982).
Psychologists primarily study regret by performing laboratory experi-
ments testing hypotheses about attitudes and mechanisms underlying the
emotion of regret. But they do not measure how regret alters actions in mar-
ket settings.1 This limits our ability to draw economic inferences from these
ﬁndings: starting with LaPiere’s (1934) classic work over seventy years ago,
and continuing in more recent work (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), psychologists
have repeatedly demonstrated a range of important gaps between attitudes
and behaviors.2 The disconnect between attitude and action raises a funda-
mental question: how does expected regret aﬀect real economic choices made
in the ﬁeld?
In this paper, we use a large dataset describing actual play at a Las Vegas
Blackjack table to answer this question. This allows us to provide some of
the ﬁrst ﬁeld evidence that expected regret aﬀects decision-making under
uncertainty. Moreover, ours is some of the ﬁrst evidence—ﬁeld evidence or
otherwise—that measures the omission/commission bias from an anticipated
regret perspective. We not only measure the economic impact of expected
regret on peoples’ actions when their own money is at stake, but also show
how the fear of regret evolves through dynamic play.
The major challenge to measuring expected regret in market settings
is the fact that evaluating most choices made under uncertainty requires
parameterizing a complex set of beliefs, measuring risk aversion, controlling
for other behavioral biases, and measuring omission/commission bias. This
is usually an insurmountable task.
1While a number of papers that focus on the role of feedback on regret, such as Larrick
and Boles (1995) or Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004), draw on real life scenarios, they do
not directly measure regret in market settings. There is no work that studies the omis-
sion/commission bias from an expected regret standpoint. We review this literature in
Section 2.
2An early survey of the attitude-behavior inconsistency is found in Wicher (1969).
Lowenstein (1996), Lowenstein, O’Donahue and Rabin (2003) and Van Boven and Lowen-
stein (2003) describe a related empathy gap. Similarly, Gilbert and Ebert (2002) demon-
strates the gap between the perceived intensity of expected regret and the actual intensity
of experienced regret, further calling into question the validity of using attitudes as a proxy
for actions.
2The game of Blackjack has two important features that make it ideal for
this purpose. First, setting aside the issue of card counting, it is easy to cat-
egorize optimal play in every conceivable situation and document departures
from optimal play in an unambiguous way. This is because there is a well-
publicized solution to the game, known as the Basic Strategy, that has been
widely accessible to card players since the 1950s. Indeed, many card playing
guides oﬀer steps for learning the basic strategy. Second, and more impor-
tantly, blackjack players place bets in the game before they make strategic
decisions. Therefore, in all but a few situations, the bet is essentially a sunk
cost once play begins, and the optimal strategy is independent of a player’s
level of risk aversion.3 This fact allows us to identify the role of regret avoid-
ance independent of other behavioral biases, such as risk aversion, status quo
bias, or other common explanations for the behavior we document.
Our data consist of over 4,300 hands played in over 1,300 rounds of actual
play in a Las Vegas casino. The data for our study were obtained from a
pilot study of the Bally MP-21 Card and Chip Recognition System, originally
designed by Mindplay Intelligent Games. The MP-21 system is optically-
based and tracks all bets and choices during play, capturing data in a covert
and non-intrusive way. This allows us to record essential features of the game
in a manner that leaves the natural play of the game is unaltered.
Using this novel data source, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the classic
omission bias is present in the ex ante choices that card players make, not
just in their ex post attitudes about the course of play at the table. When
players make mistakes, they are much more likely to do so by making an error
in which they fail to act, as compared to making an error in which they take
an unnecessary and suboptimal action. Indeed, passive mistakes are four
times more likely than aggressive mistakes. If there were no omission bias,
we would expect passive and active mistakes to be about equally likely, since
the distribution of cards places players at decision points requiring aggressive
action and passive action about equally often.4 This omission bias is robust
to the size of the player’s bet, as well as features of play such as the number
3This is true for the majority of decisions in the game, but as we discuss in detail
below, it is not true when a player doubles down or splits a hand. In that case, the bet
size is increased so we cannot disentangle risk aversion from other biases. We make this
distinction in our empirical analysis.
4In unreported simulations, we determined that basic strategy prescribes passive action
46% of the time. This implies that passive mistakes should occur 53% of the time if passive
and active mistakes were equally likely.
3of other players at the table and the running count of the deck (a tally of
high cards versus low card remaining in the deck).
The economic magnitude of these mistakes is large. In aggregate, players
in single-hand deals who followed the basic strategy won 48.1% of the time,
very close to the theoretical win rate reported in Blackjack guides. Deviators
won only 36.6% of the time, which is statistically signiﬁcantly lower. A
total of about $123,000 changed hands during the pilot study. Players that
followed the basic strategy won a total of over $60,000, while they lost only
about $56,000 following the basic strategy. In contrast, only $3,000 was won,
and over $6,000 lost in hands that deviated from the basic strategy. Of these,
passive mistakes lost over $2 for every dollar won, while aggressive mistakes
lost only about $1.50 for every dollar won. Therefore, passive mistakes are
not only more common, they are more costly.
The data not only allow us to document the magnitude of the average
omission bias, but also to study how it evolves in repeated play. We ﬁnd
evidence of a rebound eﬀect. That is, if aggressive play occurred in the prior
round, it is less likely to occur in the current round. To be precise, conditional
on an error occurring, sins of omission are roughly ten percent more likely
following aggressive play than on average. This feedback between past and
current play comports with models of learning through reinforcement and
repetition, where subjects learn to be more cautious (March, 1996, Camerer
and Ho, 1999, Roth and Erev, 1995, Erev and Roth, 1999).
We are careful to consider alternative explanations (other than omission
bias) for the choices that we observe in our data. The ﬁrst explanation is that
card counters are responsible for the deviations from basic strategy. On its
face this is an unlikely explanation, since the win rates among basic strategy
deviators are so low, and the economic losses are so high. But to explore
this explanation further, we systematically examine deviations from basic
strategy, and ﬁnd no evidence that the deviations vary with the count in a
manner prescribed by card counting strategies.5
The second is that limited cognitive ability is driving our results. Indeed,
it may be that some players ﬁnd it diﬃcult to remember the optimal choice
in all situations. To control for this, we account for the strategic diﬃculty of
certain situations (e.g. playing hands with soft versus hard totals, opportuni-
ties to split hands, doubling their position). The idea here is that if cognitive
limitations make omission bias more prevalent, then it should be more pro-
5For brevity, this analysis is omitted from the paper but is available from the authors.
4nounced among more diﬃcult hands. We ﬁnd, though, that the omission
bias is not more pronounced among hands in which higher order thinking is
required.6
The third possible explanation is that players derive utility from continued
play, and are thus reluctant to take an additional card if doing so might
exclude them from the thrill of participating in the rest of the round. To
control for this possibility we account for the position of the player at the
table and the number of players seated at the table. While we do ﬁnd that
passive mistakes are more common at larger tables, there is no evidence that
passive mistakes cluster disproportionately more among those who are high
in the seat order of the table. Moreover, the large table eﬀect is small relative
to the rebound eﬀect.7
The fear and loathing that we document in this paper builds on previ-
ous work in psychology and economics, which we describe in Section 2. In
Section 3, we review the rules of blackjack, discuss the Basic Strategy, and
describe the data that was collected and used in the analysis. In Section 4,
we provide the baseline ﬁndings. Section 5 provides a variety of robustness
checks to support the idea that the omission bias reﬂects regret and not some
other behavioral tendency. Section 6 studies how regret evolves through re-
peated play. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Psychologists and economists broadly deﬁne regret to be the negative emo-
tion associated with comparing an actual, realized outcome to a counterfac-
tual one that could have been realized if a diﬀerent choice had been made.
For example, consider two risk-neutral people who are oﬀered a lottery in
which a fair coin is ﬂipped. The coin pays $1 million dollars if it shows
heads, and nothing otherwise. In one case, the person is simply oﬀered the
chance to play the lottery—they can accept the lottery or refuse to play. In
6As we note, passive mistakes are more costly than active mistakes. If limited cognition
were indeed at the heart of our ﬁndings, we would expect people to spend more of their
cognitive resources avoiding the more expensive mistakes. This is clearly not what we ﬁnd
in the data.
7It is also noteworthy that this alternative explanation is another form of expected
regret. Speciﬁcally, people not only consider the expected remorse from potential mon-
etary losses, but also take into account the expected remorse from losing the thrill of
entertainment.
5another case, the person is oﬀered a choice between the lottery and a sure
payment of $100,000.
Suppose both subjects choose the lottery, and in both cases the coin turns
up tails, so that neither person wins any money. In the ﬁrst case, the person
is certainly disappointed, but does not experience regret, since there was
no other choice that could have oﬀered a better outcome. The second case,
however, lends itself to the possible comparison of the failed lottery to the
certain $100,000 payment. This feeling—that a diﬀerent course of action
could have yielded a better outcome—is regret.
Two fundamental assumptions about human nature lie at the core of
regret theory (Larrick and Boles, 1995). The ﬁrst is that people compare an
experienced outcome to a psychologically available outcome and experience
negative emotions when the counterfactual outcome is favored to the actual
outcome. The second is that people anticipate this emotional state and take
actions ex ante to avoid it, tilting their decision-making toward actions that
minimize the scope for experiencing regret.
There is overwhelming evidence in psychology that individuals experience
this emotional state after an action, and that the intensity of this emotional
state is more severe when the action is attributable to one’s own choice.
For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) famously propose a vignette
in which two investors, Paul and George, experience losses to their stock
portfolios. Paul loses money because he did not sell his shares, while George
loses money because he did sell his shares. Respondents overwhelmingly
feel that George, who has experienced a loss attributable to his own action,
experiences greater regret than does Paul, whose losses stem from an action
he did not take. Many other such vignettes characterize how people feel in
other “close call” situations, including people who choose a class in college
(Landman 1987), change airplane schedules but miss their ﬂight, or make
purchases when discounts are oﬀered randomly (Simonson 1992).
This literature relies on retrospective evaluations of imagined scenarios to
establish the omission/commission bias. Kahneman and Miller (1986) argue
that the underlying psychological mechanism is availability: after taking an
action it is easier to imagine the outcome of not having taken that action
than vice versa. This relative ease in producing counterfactual imagined
outcomes makes errors of commission more painful than errors of omission.
Related to this, another strand of the literature focuses on the avail-
ability of feedback about unchosen alternatives and regret, and does so us-
ing real, as opposed to imaginary, scenarios. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004)
6use the fact that the Dutch lottery contains two lottery systems—one that
provides feedback about counterfactual outcomes regardless of whether one
plays the lottery, and one that does not—to show that anticipated knowl-
edge about counterfactual outcomes alters a subject’s beliefs and attitudes
ex ante choices. In the postcode lottery, anyone with a chosen postal number
(like a zip code) who has purchased a lottery ticket wins the lottery, whereas
the national lottery provides no feedback about what would have happened.
They show that regret is intensiﬁed by the feedback that others in the same
postcode won the lottery. Similarly, Larrick and Boles (1995) show in the
context of a negotiation game that negotiators who know they will receive
feedback about the path not taken in negotiation will negotiate more aggres-
sively and reach impasses less often. Both these papers analyze regret from
a risky choice paradigm, since in both cases a subjects’ risk aversion directly
links one’s actions to the salience and availability of the counterfactual.
While these studies powerfully illustrate the psychological mechanisms
that underlie regret theory, they do not provide evidence that the omis-
sion/commission bias is present in the ex ante choices that individuals make
in market settings. First, the evidence on omission/commission is based pri-
marily on experienced regret in imagined situations, rather than anticipated
regret in real situations. Gilbert and Ebert (2002) show that there is a gap
between the perceived intensity of expected regret and the actual intensity
of experienced regret. This calls into question the validity of using ex post
attitudes as a proxy for ex ante actions and choices. Moreover, there is a dis-
connect between attitude and action, even when measured contemporaneous
with the choice being made: LaPiere’s (1934) classic study of motel owners
in California in the 1930s showed that they believed they would not accept
Chinese guests; yet when they were approached by real Chinese guests who
asked to stay in their hotel, their actions deviated from their attitudes.8
Therefore, the link between omission/commission bias and economic choices
made in anticipation of experiencing regret is an open question, but one that
is critical for gauging the economic importance of the omission/commission
bias. The medical decision-making literature (e.g., Ritov and Baron, 1990;
Asch, Baron, Hershey, Kunreuther, Meszaros, Ritov and Spranca, 1994) per-
haps comes closest by establishing a link between ex ante beliefs about vac-
cination safety and ex ante statements of belief about the intention to vacci-
nate, but this literature does not allow us to observe the actions that people
8See Dockery and Bedeian (1989) for an interesting discussion.
7take.
The Blackjack table provides an ideal laboratory for accomplishing this.
As we discuss in the next section, the game provides a unique setting in
which to study how regret aﬀects economic outcomes, free from many other
psychological biases and cognitive limitations that might otherwise generate
similar predictions.
A few previous studies have used public entertainment to study human
behavior and decision-making. In many of these venues, however, it is diﬃ-
cult to disentangle regret avoidance from other behavioral biases or cognitive
limitations. For example, Tenorio and Cason (2002) derive the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium for a game segment on the television show “The Price
is Right” and document systematic deviations from the optimal strategy.
The deviations are indeed consistent with both an omission bias and cogni-
tive limitations, but determining which one is responsible for the observed
behavior is generally diﬃcult.9
Keren and Wagenaar (1985) use the game of Blackjack as a laboratory
for understanding player’s attitudes about the game. They observe play in
an Amsterdam casino and conduct personal interviews of Blackjack players
to learn their self-perceptions of how they make decisions. Our analysis is
distinct from theirs in a number of ways. We measure the economic mag-
nitude of omission/commission bias, while they survey gamblers’ attitudes
and feelings about their own behavior. In that sense, their work corresponds
to ex post analysis of real outcomes, with a focus on attitudes, rather than
actions, while ours is an ex ante analysis. We examine how expected regret
evolves through dynamic play, while they do not. Finally, they conclude that
Blackjack players exhibit Simon’s (1957) bounded rationality, while we link
passive mistakes to the omission/commission bias.
3 The Game of Black Jack
In this section, we review the rules of Black Jack that were used in the partic-
ular casino in which the data were gathered. Then, given these speciﬁc rules
we outline the optimal strategy of play (a.k.a. basic strategy) and discuss
how this gives rise to a number of variables that we use in our analysis.
9See also analysis of “Card Sharks” by Gertner (1993), “Jeopardy!” by Metrick (1995),
“The Price is Right” by Berk, Hughson, and Vandezande (1996), and “Deal or No Deal”
by Post, Van Den Assem, Baltrussen, and Thaler (2008).
83.1 Rules of Play
3.1.1 Basic Setup
A Blackjack table consists of one dealer and from one to six players. In
our data, there are 111 rounds involving only a single player, and 57 hands
involving exactly six players. Two-, three-, and four-player rounds each occur
a little more than 300 times in our data, and there are 223 ﬁve-player rounds.
In total, we have 4,394 hands played in 1,393 rounds.
During each round, the dealer deals from a pack consisting of six standard
52-card decks. As such, there are 24 aces, 72 face cards, and 24 of each of
the numbered cards (2 through 10) in play. The numbered cards are worth
their face value, the face cards are worth 10 each, and each ace is worth 1 or
11 at the discretion of the player. The entire pack is shuﬄed and a player
is randomly chosen to insert a red plastic card within the deck, cutting the
deck. The dealer then places the red card toward the bottom of the deck and
play begins. During subsequent play, cards are dealt from the top until the
red card is shown. When the red card is reached during a round, then that
round of play completes without interruption, the deck is reshuﬄed and the
cycle begins again.
Before any cards are dealt, each player places an initial bet. In our data,
bet sizes range from $5 (occurring 381 times) to $1100 (occurring 10 times).
The most common bet in our data is a $10 bet, which occurs 1,974 times.
After the initial bets have been placed, the dealer begins by dealing each
player at the table (including himself) one card face up, each in turn. This
is followed by a second card face up for each of the players in turn, but
the dealer’s second card is dealt face down. The dealer’s face-down card is
referred to as the hole card. At this point, each player may choose between
a variety of choices, as described below.
3.1.2 Players’ Behavior
The object of the game for each player is to obtain a total greater than the
total of the dealer’s cards in the game, but less than or equal to 21. If a
player wishes to add cards, they may successively request an additional card
from the dealer, which they receive face-up, for the other players to see. Each
player may continue to take a hit as long as the player’s total does not exceed
21, at which point they “bust” and automatically lose their bet (even if the
dealer eventually busts as well). Of course, players (excluding the dealer) are
9not required to increase the number of cards in their hand (i.e. take a hit)
and may opt to “stand” with any total less than or equal to 21.
Each player’s turn is exhausted before the next player has an opportunity
to take a card, and the play moves around the table until all players have
had the opportunity to stand or take a hit.
This sequence of action—bets placed ﬁrst, followed by cards dealt—is
one of the key features that make the game of Blackjack such an attractive
setting for exploring regret. In the course of play described above, there is
no scope for risk aversion to factor into a player’s strategy, since at the time
the player chooses a course of action, the bet is ﬁxed. Thus, the best that
the player can do is to maximize the odds that he or she receives a payout
conditional on the ﬁxed bet.
There are, however, some instances in which a player can alter his or her
initial bet after the cards have been dealt. After the player is dealt two cards,
they may opt to “double down” and receive one more card. If they choose to
exercise this option, they double their bet and must stand once they receive
the extra card. Dealer play and settlement is unchanged.
The second instance occurs when a player is dealt two cards of the same
value (for example, two eights). Then the player has the option to split
the pair, receive another card for each, and form two separate hands. Their
initial bet goes with one set, and a second bet of equal size is added to the
other. The player plays each hand according to the rules already mentioned.
Settlement and dealer play is unchanged, except that all naturals (see below)
are treated as a normal 21 and do not payoﬀ at 1.5 times the bet. A player
splitting any pair except aces may opt to double down on either or both of
their split hands.
Two other options that may exist in many casinos are the option to
buy insurance and the option to surrender the hand. In the game that was
played at the table at which the data were collected, there was no option to
surrender the hand and there was no instance in which any of the players
bought insurance. Therefore, rather than describe these options in detail
here, we refer the reader to a standard book on Blackjack (e.g. Tamburin
1994).
3.1.3 Dealer’s Play
In Blackjack, the dealer’s play must conform to a prescribed strategy known
in advance to all players. This is another reason why Blackjack is an ideal
10setting for identifying errors associated with regret, for there is no scope for
players to hold beliefs about the dealer’s strategy that deviate from one an-
other. That is, there is no scope for appealing to a particular belief structure
to determine whether a particular course of play was appropriate or not. The
dealer eﬀectively acts as an automaton, behaving as follows.
Once all of the players have made their decisions regarding play, the dealer
turns over their hole card. If the sum of the two cards is 17 or greater, the
dealer stands without taking a card. If the sum of the two cards is less than
or equal to 16, the dealer must take another card (take a hit). The dealer
continues to take cards until their total exceeds 16. In the version of the
game played in our data, dealers do not have the option to take more cards
when their cards total 17 or greater with an ace counting as 11. That is,
dealers may not hit on “soft 17”.
If the dealer’s total is between 17 and 21, they compare their hands with
the players who are still in the game (i.e., the players who did not bust).
However, if their hand total exceeds 21, they bust and lose to players who
have totals of 21 or less.
This structure of play between the dealer and the players creates a situa-
tion that is naturally conducive to studying the impact of regret on decisions
under uncertainty. Since any player who busts is excluded from the settle-
ment if the dealer later busts, this creates a natural heuristic that favors
errors of omission. Namely, a player who is aﬀected by regret is concerned
with two scenarios ex post: the ﬁrst is that they took an extra card, busted,
and then later learned that the dealer busted; the second is that they stood
too soon and learned that the dealer beat them. An omission bias associates
lower regret with the latter outcome, since it was not caused by the willful
action of the player (i.e., to take another card).
3.1.4 Settlement
As mentioned above, if a player’s total exceeds 21, they automatically lose
their bet. If a player’s total is less or equal to 21 and exceeds the dealer’s
total, they win and receive their initial bet plus an amount equal to their
original bet. If a player’s total is less than the dealer’s total, the player loses
their initial bet. Finally, if the dealer and the player have equally strong
hands (equal totals not exceeding 21), the hand is called a “push” and no
money exchanges hands.
If a player receives an ace and a either a face card or a ten (totaling 21)
11on the initial deal, they have a “blackjack”. As long as the dealer does not
have a natural as well, the player receives a net payout from the dealer of 1.5
times their initial bet. Otherwise, the hand is a push. Note that acquiring
more than two cards that total 21 does not constitute a natural.
From the structure of settlement, it is clear that there is no direct strategic
interaction between the players—the rules of the game do not pit one player
against another, and one player’s victory does not preclude another player
from also winning (except by aﬀecting the cards that are available to draw).
That is, holding constant the sequence of cards that were dealt, whether
Player 1 wins or loses has no eﬀect on the size of Player 2’s payoﬀ. Moreover,
it is never desirable to attempt to starve another player of a card, since
this behavior has no impact on a player’s payoﬀ. A player’s payoﬀ is only
determined by their own choices to take a hit or stand based on the cards
they were dealt and their (common) knowledge of the dealer’s hand. This
simple game structure makes it easy to attribute the observed patterns of
play to the omission bias described above.
3.2 The Basic Strategy
Given the rules of the game as laid out above, there exists a reasonably simple
algorithm for maximizing one’s expected return given the cards a player is
dealt and the knowledge of the dealer’s face-up card. This is known as the
Basic Strategy. The strategy is basic in the sense that is does not require any
attempt to recall the cards that have been played since the previous shuﬄe.
In this section, we describe the optimal play for Black Jack, given the
rules listed in Section 3.1 and the absence of card counting. The optimal
strategy for a one-deck game was ﬁrst published by Baldwin, Cantey, Maisel,
and McDermott (1956) and has since been extended to multiple decks and
card-counting schemes (e.g. Thorp 1962, Wong 1994, Griﬃn 1999).
Figure 1 describes the optimal strategy for the game we are considering.
Each panel describes one strategic situation for the player in question. The
top panel describes optimal play when a player has a hard total: i.e., when
the player is not dealt an Ace or a pair, and therefore has no possibility to
split the hand or to otherwise reclassify the value of the Ace after receiving
another card. Although the exact prescriptions of the Basic Strategy for
hard totals are somewhat more complicated than this, the bulk of the Basic
Strategy for hard totals can be communicated by four simple rules. The ﬁrst
is to never take a hit on a hand totaling seventeen or higher. The second is
12to never stand when the dealer shows seven or higher (provided the player’s
total is sixteen or below). The third is to never stand below twelve. The
fourth is never to take a hit when the dealer shows two through six.
The strategy is more complicated for soft totals (that is, hands involving
an ace, which can be either be counted as a one or an eleven) or pairs. With
soft totals, the player eﬀectively holds an option to convert an eleven-valued
ace to a one if the card received would otherwise trigger a bust. The opti-
mality of standing versus doubling down versus taking a hit depends on the
relative value of this option as compared to the dealer’s likely strategy. With
pairs, optimal play likewise requires the player to weigh the expected value
of splitting, taking an additional card, doubling down, or standing against
the dealer’s strategy. The fact that obeying the basic strategy involves both
memory (the player must memorize the basic strategy table) as well as vari-
ation in cognitive diﬃculty (some plays are obvious, others require a more
subtle appreciation of strategic play) gives rise to variation in the data that
allow us to proxy for a player’s skill and/or memory. We discuss these and
other variables below.
3.3 Our Data
The data consists of 4,394 Blackjack hands played according to the rules de-
ﬁned in Section 3.1 during a pilot test of the MP-21 Card and Chip Recog-
nition System designed by Mindplay Intelligent Games.10 The data that
we obtained are proprietary and provide only a partial glimpse into the ac-
tions of each player at the table. We have data at the player-level, where a
unique round number allows us to identify how many players were seated in
a particular round, but not the player’s individual identities.
Table 2 provides a complete list of the variables that we can glean from
the data. For each player, we know the size of their initial bet, whether
they doubled down or split, and whether they won, lost, or pushed. In cases
where hands were split, we know the outcome of each hand. We also whether
they deviated from the basic strategy, and the nature of the deviation if it
occurred. In addition, we also know the running count at the beginning of
each round. Importantly, however, we do not know the cards played by each
player: we only know a particular sequence of play when it resulted in a
10We excluded 156 hands from the initial data set that were interrupted during play.
Including these hands has no eﬀect on our analysis.
13deviation from the basic strategy.
Since we do not have unique player identiﬁers,we do not have any infor-
mation on player demographics. Without player identiﬁers, it is not possible
to track an individual’s play from one round to the next. Therefore we focus
instead on whether particular types of play occurred in a particular round.
This weakens our ability to identify either rebound or contagion, since we
cannot be sure that a particular player did not leave the table, nor can
we know if new players arrived. At the same time, it is commonplace for
would-be players to observe play at a table before taking a seat. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that all players seated are at least partly aware of
recent play at the table when a round begins.
Finally, although we have the running count, we do not know when the
pack is re-shuﬄed. This makes a precise calculation of the true count from
the running count impossible. (The true count is the running count divided
by the number of decks remaining before the shoe is reshuﬄed.) Although the
sine qua non for identifying card counters would be to look for variation in bet
size that varied strategically with the true count, it is extremely unlikely that
card counters were present in our data. We say this because, as we discussed
in the introduction below, players who deviate from the basic strategy lose
far more often than players who follow the basic strategy. Moreover, in
unreported tables we have veriﬁed that two tell-tale signs of card counters
are absent: ﬁrst, variation in initial bet size is not explained by time varying
features of play at the table; second, deviations from the basic strategy do
not covary with the running count in a manner prescribed by card counting
strategies (e.g., Baldwin et al, 1956, or Wong, 1994).
4 The Omission Bias
Table 3 begins by simply reporting the outcomes that occurred during the
pilot study. In Panel A, we focus on single-hand deals: that is, deals in which
players did not split their hand into two or more hands. It shows that 1,856
hands out of a total of 4,287 single-hand deals resulted in wins. Among
players who followed the basic strategy, the winning percentage is 48.1%,
which is statistically much higher than the 37% experienced by those who
deviate from the basic strategy (the associated t-statistic for the diﬀerence
in means is over 4 in absolute value).
Panel A also illustrates the ﬁrst-order result: approximately 80% of all
14deviations from the Basic Strategy involve passive mistakes; ones in which
the player should have taken an extra card and did not, ones in which the
player should have split or doubled down but did not. Only one mistake in
ﬁve involves players behaving overly aggressively. In panel B we no longer
restrict attention to single-hand deals, but also include deals in which the
player (rightly or wrongly) split. In a handful of cases, the player splits
more than twice, but in general the basic fact that passive errors are much
more common than aggressive errors holds regardless of the number of hands
played (or won).
Panel C illustrates the economic consequences of winning, losing, and
deviating from the basic strategy. Of the 1,872 winning hands, all but a little
over 7% followed the basic strategy. $62,035 was won by players following
the basic strategy, while $56,402 were lost in the 2,104 losing hands that
followed the basic strategy. Thus, the ratio of monetary losses to wins is
0.9. In contrast, the 7% of hands that won while deviating from the basic
strategy won a total of $3,021. About 12% of losing hands deviated from the
basic strategy, losing a total of $6,387. This is a loss-to-win ratio of 2.11.
Or to put it slightly diﬀerently, those who followed the basic strategy won
about $1.23 per hand for every dollar lost per hand. In constrast, deviators
won about 80 cents per hand for every dollar per hand lost.
5 Does the Omission Bias Capture Regret?
The remainder of Table 3 demonstrate that this basic feature of the data is
robust to a variety of alternative explanations for the omission bias.
One potential explanation is that passive errors are a sign of inexperi-
ence. By examining the bet size distribution, we can see whether passive
errors cluster among low-bet hands, which would corroborate this explana-
tion. Panel D shows that this is not the case. Indeed, passive errors out-
number aggressive errors more than two to one among bets larger than ﬁfty
dollars. The handful of errors made by gamblers betting more than $100 are
all passive. Thus, there is no evidence that inexperienced players who are
reluctant to bet large sums of money are driving our result. The omission
bias we document holds more or less evenly across the bet size distribution.
Another possible explanation for the omission bias is that it stems from
bounded rationality. That is, could the omission bias be driven by hands
that are in some sense harder to play because they involve a more subtle
15understanding of the optimal strategy? To examine this possibility, we also
considered whether the omission bias is more severe among soft hands—hands
in which the player is dealt an Ace, which can either be played as a high card
(for a value of 11) or a low card (for a value of 1). There is no statistically
discerning diﬀerence in the frequency of basic strategy deviations between
hard and soft hands.
A prominent alternative explanation is that omission bias is driven by
a player’s desire to continue play. That is, players derive utility from the
act of play and are willing to sustain passive losses more readily because
they prolong play while active losses do not. There are two versions of this
explanation, one that extends across rounds to the player’s overall enjoyment
of an evening of Blackjack, the second a narrower version that only pertains
to the player’s desire to stay in the game for a particular round of play. Of
course, the ﬁrst variant cannot explain omission bias: a player who wishes
to play blackjack for as long as possible over the course of a long period of
time (an hour, a day, a weekend) should follow the basic strategy and place
bets in such a way to minimize the probability of ruin.
The second variant, however, provides a viable explanation for omission
bias. It suggests that players may prefer sins of omission to sins of commission
if they derive utility from being seated in active play at the table throughout
the entirety of the round. That is, players may favor omission bias if they
simply wish to be in play when the dealer plays his hand.
To test for this possibility, we begin in Table 4 by analyzing the dis-
tribution of passive and aggressive errors at diﬀerent seat positions around
the table. Since the total number of players varies from one round to the
next, the columns of Table 4 report diﬀerent table sizes. The rows of Table
4 report diﬀerent seat positions. For example, the distribution of errors at
four-person tables indicates that seat position 1 is associated with 20 passive
errors and 6 aggressive errors. Thirteen passive and seven aggressive errors
were committed at the second seat position, and so forth. If anticipation
drives the omission bias, then we would expect to see passive errors cluster
disproportionately among low seat positions, since these players would face
the longest time to wait before learning the ultimate outcome of the game.
But we do not. As the right-most column of Table 4 shows, the distribution
of passive and aggressive errors is roughly uniform across seat positions.
Rather than assuming that anticipation varies across players at a partic-
ular table, it may be the case that average anticipation is higher at a larger
table. The bottom row of Table 4 provides some evidence in favor of this
16hypothesis, since it shows that large tables contain more passive errors than
small tables. Of course, since in some sense each seat represents a draw from
a bernoulli distribution of passive/aggressive errors, this simply may reﬂect
a mechanical relation between table size and omission bias. Nevertheless, we
extend our analysis in Table 5 by attempting to predict passive errors by seat
position alone. In the ﬁrst two columns we model passive errors as a function
of the seat order. Model 1 is a probit speciﬁcation, while model 2 is a linear
probability model. The second two columns predict passive errors with seat
position using dummies for table size. By including table-size dummies, the
point estimate on seat position is only identiﬁed by variation in seat position
within tables of a certain size. Again, model 3 is a probit speciﬁcation, while
model 4 is a linear probability model. Table 5 contains no evidence that
seat position predicts passive mistakes. The models reported in this table
are robust to including dummies for seat position, including a dummy for
whether the person making the mistake was seated just before the dealer.
6 The Evolution of Regret in Repeated Play
While data limitations prevent us from tracking the behavior of particular
respondents over time, we can ask how the prevalence of a particular type of
play in one round aﬀects play in later rounds. We take up this issue in Table
6. This table reports Probit regressions in which the dependent variable is
a dummy for making a mistake, making an aggressive mistake, or making a
passive mistake.
The ﬁrst two columns focus on mistakes overall. Basically, these two
columns provide no evidence that mistakes cluster in time—there is no ev-
idence that behavior in the previously recorded round of play aﬀects the
overall error rate in the current round. This holds whether or not we include
dummies for the bet size categories noted in Table 3.
Columns (3) and (4) focus only on aggressive mistakes, and here we see a
diﬀerent picture. The left-hand side variable is a dummy for whether a player
committed an aggressive mistake; in column (3) the right-hand side variables
include dummies for whether anyone in the prior round received blackjack, as
well as whether anyone played aggressively. Here, aggressive play is deﬁned as
any of the following: (i) a player made an aggressive error in the prior round,
(ii) a player split or doubled down in the prior round. The loading in column
(3) indicates that aggressive mistakes are about 1% less likely if aggressive
17play occurred in the prior round. In column (4) we introduce controls for
the number of players in the current round, the running count, and bet-size
dummies. The loading on aggressive play is eﬀectively unchanged. To put
this number in economic perspective, about ten percent of all hands involve
errors, and about one in ﬁve errors is aggressive; therefore, a one percent
reduction in the rate of aggressive errors cuts the error rate in half.
Columns (5) and (6) indicate that passive mistakes are largely unpre-
dictable based on past play. Like overall mistakes, they are not explained
by whether there was aggressive play in the prior, or whether there was a
blackjack in the prior round. This is true regardless of whether we control
for bet size and the number of players at the table.
Because we have a richer set of data for the hands involving mistakes, we
turn to an analysis of aggressive versus passive play conditional on a mistake
occurring. This is presented in Table 7, which reports Probit regressions in
which the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a mistake was passive.
By including a richer set of explanatory variables than what is available in
Table 6, we can better explore reasons for the rebound eﬀect that we see,
whereby aggressive play is less likely in the wake of prior aggressive play.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 7 predict passive mistakes with a dummy
for whether a natural was scored in the previous round, with various speciﬁ-
cations accounting for bet size and seat position ﬁxed eﬀects. In general, the
point estimates on Prior Round Blackjack in the ﬁrst three columns support
the idea that players make more passive mistakes when the table is perceived
to be “hot” or favoring the players rather than the dealer. But these eﬀects
are not statistically signiﬁcant. In the second three columns we add a dummy
for Prior Round Aggressive Play. In column (4), the variable is added alone.
In Column (5), we include bet size dummies, while in Column (6), we in-
clude seat order dummies. In all speciﬁcations, prior aggressive play raises
the probability of a passive mistake by about 13%.
Columns (7), (8) and (9) include additional controls. These include the
number of players in the current round, the running count, and a dummy for
whether the player was dealt a soft-hand. (This is identiﬁable because we are
focusing only on mistakes.) In general, these columns show that the Prior
Round Aggressive Play continues to raise the probability of a passive error,
even after we control for the fact that passive mistakes are more common at
larger tables. There is no statistically reliable evidence that soft-totals or the
running count of the deck has any eﬀect on passive mistakes.
While Table 7 shows that prior aggressive play aﬀects the probability of a
18passive error, it lumps together splits, doubling down, and aggressive errors.
Of these, doubling down is the most aggressive form of play: it involves
adding more money to the bet, taking a hit, and extinguishing the option to
take any additional hits thereafter. Thus, if prior aggressive play causes a
rebound eﬀect, we would expect this to be strongest in situations where the
prior aggression came from doubling down.
Table 8 explores this by breaking prior aggressive play into three sources:
splits, doubling down, and aggressive mistakes that lead to losses. The ﬁrst
four columns model the probability of a passive error. Column (1) shows
that prior doubling down alone has about a 12% increase on the probability
of a passive mistake. Columns (2) and (3) show a large, but statistically
insigniﬁcant, eﬀect on prior aggressive losses and prior splits, respectively.
When we put these together in Column (4), we see that the doubling down
variable dominates.
While doubling down may be the most aggressive play at the table—since
it involves exercising the option to continue drawing cards—it also involves
elements of risk aversion, since it requires the player to double the size of the
bet. This opens the possibility that it is risk aversion, rather than regret,
that is rebounding in the wake of prior aggressive play. To investigate this
possibility, column (5) regresses the size of the initial bet on prior doubling
down, prior aggressive losses, and prior splits. Aggressive losses have the
predicted sign, lowering the size of the bet, but this is insigniﬁcant. (Again,
we cannot rule out that players have departed or new players have joined.)
Prior instances of doubling down, however, actually raise the initial bet.
This does not support the hypothesis that that it is risk aversion, rather
than regret, that is rebounding.
7 Discussion
This paper uses novel ﬁeld data obtained from actual play at a Las Vegas
Blackjack table to show that errors of omission are four times more likely
than errors of commission. This profound omission bias occurs in spite of
the fact that real economic agents are making real decisions with their own
money, reaping the rewards of skill and good luck, suﬀering the costs of bad
luck and mistakes. The bias we observe grows more common in the wake of
past aggressive play, and is robust to controls for memory and skill.
Perhaps few decisions of economic consequence are made at a Blackjack
19table. Nevertheless, the underlying mechanism here—choosing between act-
ing or not acting in an economic environment with uncertain payoﬀs—is
present in many economic problems, such as planning for retirement, search-
ing for a job, or starting a business. Indeed, the ﬁndings from our ﬁeld study
are striking when one considers that Blackjack players are not a random sam-
ple of economic agents: they have self-selected into the game of Blackjack
based on their willingness—indeed, desire—to bear risk. The conservatism
that we identify at a Blackjack table is all the more severe when we consider
this self-selection issue. And of course, unlike Blackjack, everyday economic
problems that involve the decision to act typically also involve risk, ambiguity
and other behavioral factors. Exploring the broader economic implications
of omission bias in more complicated settings where multiple biases interact
remains an important question for future research.
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24Table 1: The Basic Strategy
Your Dealer’s face-up card
hand 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A
Hard totals
17-20 S S S S S S S S S S
13-16 S S S S S H H H H H
12 H H S S S H H H H H
11 D D D D D D D D D H
10 D D D D D D D D H H
9 H D D D D H H H H H
8 H H H H H H H H H H
Soft totals
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A
A,8 A,9 S S S S S S S S S S
A,7 S D D D D S S H H H
A,6 H D D D D H H H H H
A,4 A,5 H H D D D H H H H H
A,2 A,3 H H H D D H H H H H
Pairs
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A
A,A SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP
10,10 S S S S S S S S S S
9,9 SP SP SP SP SP S SP SP S S
8,8 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP
7,7 SP SP SP SP SP SP H H H H
6,6 SP SP SP SP SP H H H H H
5,5 D D D D D D D D H H
4,4 H H H SP SP H H H H H
3,3 SP SP SP SP SP SP H H H H
2,2 SP SP SP SP SP SP H H H H
Basic strategy table for 3 or more decks, dealer stands
on soft 17, double on any 2 cards, double after split
allowed except on aces, and blackjack pays 3:2. Key:
S = Stand, H = Hit, D = Double, SP = Split.
25Table 2: Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Deﬁnition Availability?
Players The number of players seated at the table for each round All
of play. Varies from 1 to 6.
Blackjack A dummy for whether a player in a particular round scored All
a natural.
Win, Loss, Push An indicator for whether the player won, lost, or tied with All
the dealer. Available for any subhand that was played de-
riving from a split.
Initial Bet Size The amount of dollars placed in the initial bet All
Running Count The number of cards 2-6 that have been played minus the All
number of cards 10, Jack, Queen, King, or Ace that have
been played. A high running count indicates that the re-
maining deck is rich in high point cards. Likewise, a low
running count indicates that the remaining deck is rich in
low cards.
Prior Round Black Jack A dummy for whether any player in the most recent round All
of play scored a natural.
Prior Round Aggressive Play A dummy for whether any player in the most recent round All
of play doubled down, split, or committed an aggressive
error.
Passive Error A dummy for whether the player deviated from the basic Mistakes
strategy by standing when they should have asked for an
additional card, or by otherwise failing to split or to double-
down as required under the basic strategy.
Aggressive Error A dummy for whether the player deviated from the basic Mistakes
strategy by taking a card when they should not have, or
whether they split or doubled-down when they should not
have.
Soft Hand A dummy for whether an Ace was dealt Mistakes
Seats Position An indicator, ranging from 1 to 6, that indicates where the Mistakes
player sat in the order of play at the table.
This table describes the variables that are provided in the data as well as the ones that we are able to construct. The
column “Availability” indicates whether a variable is available for all hands, or rather for errors only.
26Table 3: Blackjack Outcomes
Panel A: Single-Hand Deals
Followed Committed Percent Percent:
Outcome Hands BS Error Error Aggressive Passive
Player Wins 1856 1717† 139† 0.07 0.20 0.80
Player Loses 2091 1850 241 0.12 0.20 0.80
Player Pushes 340 324 16 0.05 0.19 0.81
Panel B: All Hands
Followed Committed Percent Percent:
Wins Basic Strategy Error Error Aggressive Passive
0 2524 2258 266 0.11 0.20 0.80
1 1834 1701 133 0.07 0.20 0.80
2 31 25 6 0.19 0.00 1.00
3 5 1 4 0.80 0.50 0.50
4 1 0 1 1.00 1.00 0.00
Panel C: Total Amount of Money Won and Lost
Followed Committed Percent Cash from:
Hands BS Error Error Aggressive Passive
Player Won 1,871 $62,035 $3,021 7.69% $705 $2,316
Player Lost 2,524 $56,402 $6,387 11.59% $1,142 $5,245
Panel D: Bet Size and Blackjack Outcomes
Followed Committed Percent Percent:
Bet Size Basic Strategy Error Error Aggressive Passive
$10 or less 2284 2070 214 0.09 0.21 0.79
$11-$20 1037 956 81 0.08 0.14 0.86
$21-$50 827 733 94 0.11 0.23 0.77
$55-$100 132 120 12 0.09 0.33 0.67
$105-$500 81 73 8 0.10 0.00 1.00
$1000-$1100 31 30 1 0.03 0.00 1.00
† Note: Players that follow the basic strategy in our data win 48.1% of the time, and
deviators win 36.6% of the time. The win rate among basic strategy followers in our
data is very close to that observed widely in Blackjack manuals, for example Baldwin et
al (1956).
27Table 4: Do Passive Mistakes Reﬂect Anticipation?: Seat Position Evidence
































































































Notes: The top number is the sum total of passive errors that occurred in Seat Position
X at a table with Y players at the table. The bottom number is the sum of aggressive
errors.
28Table 5: Predicting Passive Mistakes with Seat Position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Seat Position 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019
(0.0922) (0.0947) (0.266) (0.296)
2-player table -0.009 -0.008
(0.935) (0.940)
3-player table 0.017 0.023
(0.870) (0.839)
4-player table -0.019 -0.015
(0.857) (0.893)
5-player table 0.088 0.091
(0.375) (0.414)
6-player table 0.031 0.040
(0.801) (0.761)
Observations 399 399 399 399
R2 0.01 0.007 0.02 0.018
Notes: Observations are included only if they are deviations from the basic
strategy. The dependent variable in each regression is a dummy for whether the
mistake was passive. Seat position is a variable that takes on values 1 through
6 depending on where the person sat at the table, with seat 1 being the furthest
seat from the dealer in a n-hand round. Variables labelled ‘x-player table’ are
ﬁxed eﬀects for table size, which in turn identify the seat position variable by
variation within tables of the same size, rather than across tables of diﬀerent
sizes. Columns (1) and (3) are probit speciﬁcations in which coeﬃcients are
reported as marginal probabilities. Columns (2) and (4) are linear probability
model speciﬁcations. The constant terms estimated in Columns (2) and (4)
are not statistically distinguishable from 0.80.
29Table 6: What Causes Mistakes in Blackjack?
Mistakes Aggressive Passive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prior Round Blackjack -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 0.000 -0.001
(0.388) (0.371) (0.0772) (0.102) (0.982) (0.925)
Prior Round Aggressive Play 0.004 0.003 -0.013** -0.013** 0.018* 0.017
(0.673) (0.745) (0.00234) (0.00242) (0.0408) (0.0571)
Players in Current Round 0.002 -0.002 0.004
(0.565) (0.134) (0.170)
Running Count 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.919) (0.450) (0.662)
Bet Size eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4394 4391 4394 4279 4394 4391
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Notes: The sample includes all hands played, including hands that followed the basic strategy.
Prior blackjack is a dummy equaling one if any player in the most recently recorded round of
play had a blackjack. Prior aggressive play is a dummy for whether any player in the most recent
round of play doubled down or split, regardless of whether this was dictated by the basic strategy.
Controls include eﬀects for bet sizes (as reported in Panel C of Table 2), the number of players at









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 8: Another Look at Passive Mistakes
DV = Pr(Passive Error) Bet size
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior Round Double-down 0.133* 0.123* 4.074
(0.0103) (0.0171) (0.563)
Prior Round Aggressive Loss 0.144 0.127 -9.264
(0.0606) (0.108) (0.380)
Prior Round Split 0.080 0.073 1.646
(0.299) (0.333) (0.877)
Players 0.044* 0.042* 0.044* 0.041* -0.077
(0.0186) (0.0250) (0.0209) (0.0293) (0.975)
Running Count 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.662
(0.377) (0.407) (0.416) (0.382) (0.390)
Bet Size eﬀects Yes Yes No Yes No
Seat Position eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 396 410
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 -
Notes: The sample includes only those hands that deviated from the basic strategy. Prior aggres-
sive loss is a dummy for whether any player in the most recent round of play doubled down or
split or made an aggressive error which subsequently resulted in a loss. Prior Double-down is a
dummy equaling one if any player in the prior round doubled down. Prior Split is a dummy if
any player split in the prior round. Bet size eﬀects are as reported in Panel C of Table 2. Seat
Position eﬀects are as reported in Table 4.
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